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Revision and Immortality in Philosophical 
Argumentation: Continuing Thoughts on the 
Rhetorical Wedge 
MARl LEE MIFSUD University of Richmond 
Abstract: This essay explores Johnstone's 
idea that "rhetoric is a wedge." In particular, 
it explores the place of this idea in 
Johnstone's philosophy of argument, the 
need to confront this idea with argument, 
and ways of confronting it with ad rem and 
ad hominem arguments. 
Resume: On explore I'idee du Johnstone 
selon laquelle la rhetorique est une "coin". 
En particulier, on examine I'importance de 
cette idee dans sa philosophie de I 'argument 
et Ie besoin d'opposer cette idee aux argu-
ments ad rem et ad hominem. 
Keywords: Henry Johnstone, rhetoric, argument, the rhetorical wedge, the rhetorical 
bridge, ad rem, ad hominem, self-referential inconsistency. 
I write this essay in tribute to Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., my mentor and friend. 
Before Johnstone died we had a final conversation about writing. He remarked to 
me that he had tried to write as he had tried to live, freely and with the kind of 
passion, surprise, and wonder that can come only from an unprogrammatic ap-
proach void of obstacles or plans, with the exception of interesting questions 
arising from perplexing problems. I write this tribute to Henry Johnstone with 
these remarks in mind. I begin with the question that Johnstone asked me toward 
the end of his life, namely how can one attack the thesis "rhetoric is a wedge"? 
This question has a certain shock value when we consider that the idea of the 
rhetorical wedge is one of the most pivotal in Johnstone's philosophy of argument. 
The rhetorical wedge, as Johnstone came to frame its function, is a means, per-
haps the only means, of evoking and maintaining the consciousness necessary for 
communication (Johnstone, 1970, pp. 115-121). The very function of rhetoric is 
to call attention to a situation for which objectivity is claimed. Rhetoric's solicitation 
of attention is wholly different from a stimulus that directly excites a reflex, never 
emerging as an object of consciousness. Such a stimulus is irrelevant to rhetorical 
transactions (Johnstone, 1990, p. 334). All rhetorical transactions open up a space 
of consciousness between an audience and some fact or idea of which it has been 
hitherto unconscious. Johnstone uses the rhetorical wedge metaphor for whatever 
act of speech that is capable of separating a subject from an object in such a way 
that the former becomes conscious of the latter. These acts of speech can be as 
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mundane as someone asking, "Isn't that your telephone ringing?" or as extraordi-
nary as someone asking "Will we always be able to bear the financial cost of 
applying the results of ongoing medical research to the project of extending our 
lives further and further?" Upon hearing this question, one may for the first time 
become aware of having hitherto unthinkingly assumed the cost to be continually 
bearable. 
When rhetoric acts like a wedge, it functions to evoke consciousness by sepa-
rating a person addressed from some of her stimuli: 
Wedges separate. What has been separated must have at least two parts. 
The two parts separated by the wedge of rhetoric are the hitherto unnoticed 
items now brought into the focus of attention, and the self that does the 
attending. One cannot evoke an object of attention without evoking a self. 
(Johnstone, 1980, p. 68.) 
In the absence of the rhetorical wedge, no medium can be opened between con-
sciousness and its object. Johnstone found Aristotle's message to Democritus 
important for articulating this position, namely that in the absence of a medium we 
could see nothing at alI.I Sight presupposes a metaxu, or an "in-between," what 
Johnstone sometimes called an interface. We could not, for example, see an object 
placed directly on the eye. Language, the medium of communication, must like-
wise separate the message from its recipient. Otherwise the activity would be akin 
to opening a person's skull and simply placing the information on her brain. Com-
puter communication works this way, but in human communication, information 
does not pass directly from its source to the storage facilities of the receiver. The 
gap that interrupts this direct passage is created by the interface of the rhetorical 
wedge. The rhetorical wedge is what creates open-mindedness through the com-
ing of contradiction. On the one hand, persons experiencing the rhetorical wedge 
wish to maintain themselves. On the other hand, their exposure to something that 
appears to bring their position into contradiction necessitates their risking change. 
The tension between the desire to maintain themselves and the risk of change is 
brought into being by means of the rhetorical wedge. "Such tension is necessary 
to any human being who wishes to transcend the horizons of immediate experi-
ence and inhabit a world" (Johnstone, 1965, p. 4). 
Considering the importance of the position that "rhetoric is a wedge" has in 
Johnstone's theory of argument, before obliging him in pursuit of the question of 
how we should attack it perhaps we should begin by asking why we should. We 
might justify the inquiry on the surface by attending to the fact that Henry Johnstone, 
the dying author of the idea, wanted to keep the conversation going. But framing 
the "why" in this way is problematic. If Johnstone had wanted the conversation 
on "rhetoric as a wedge" to continue, why would he have been motivated to attack 
it? Why not advocate the motto to identify his philosophical legacy? 
Although much of this essay will be devoted to pursuing this question, we can 
begin for now by exploring the possibility of polemic in argumentation. Polemical 
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confrontation forces a person to either revise or abandon her position. Both revi-
sion and abandonment are ways of elaborating and continuing the life of inquiry-
revision does so by allowing the position to become more nuanced and complex; 
abandonment does so by its committing inquiry to the quest for a more satisfac-
tory substitute (Johnstone, 1978, p. 38). The mortality of inquiry comes with the 
stiffening of a position. Positions stiffen when they are not kept flexible by argu-
ments voiced effectively against them. Such flexibility can be recognized as an 
age-old office of rhetoric whose duties are to move and to bend (flectere). To 
prevent such stiffening of "the rhetorical wedge," to make it flexible, hence to 
allow it to move and live on, we need to confront it with argument. 
Perhaps the best way to start would be to review the work Johnstone and I did 
prior to his death. We had noted only that rhetoric and the wedge do not often 
coincide (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999). Many wedges are not rhetorical, and 
more important to our concerns at the time, not all rhetoric is wedge-like. Exam-
ples of both such failures of coincidence abound. Commands and threats are uses 
of the wedge to produce non-rhetorical results; they reveal the failure of wedge 
and rhetoric to occupy the same relative position. While threats and commands 
can perhaps be thought of as exemplifying rhetoric, albeit of a "degenerate" sort-
one can hardly look down the barrel of a pistol without becoming fully conscious-
there is no obvious way in which they are degenerate uses of the wedge in any 
useful sense of 'degenerate.' The threatener and the issuer of commands ignore 
bilaterality, a concept central to Johnstone's idea of the rhetorical wedge. Johnstone 
marks off the orthodox version of rhetoric from the degenerate version by observ-
ing that what is ordinarily recognized as rhetoric is bilateral. A threat, on the other 
hand, is unilateral; a gunman, for example, drives a wedge into the experience of 
his victim, but not vice-versa. The gunman objectifies his victim as a means to 
fulfilling his wishes, but whatever is objectified to this extent is likely to lose its 
objectivity and recede into the background of unnoticed stimuli. A victim so 
objectified cannot force himself upon the attention of the gunman (Johnstone, 
1990, p. 335). That the gunman's performance suppresses all efforts of his vic-
tims to cope with him in reciprocative terms is a requirement fundamental to the 
success of his performance. To put the matter another way, the person success-
fully addressed by a threat or command is unable to respond freely. Neither are 
natural wedges, as opposed to symbolic wedges, generally considered rhetorical 
acts. Besides reacting by unplugging one's computer, how can one respond in 
kind to a lightening bolt? Wedges fall short of full rhetoricality when they do not 
maintain throughout the possibility of bilateral exchange. 
Not only do the wedge and rhetoric fail to overlap because not all wedges are 
rhetorical, but because not all rhetoric is wedge-like. Such wedgeless rhetoric is 
generally characterized by a speaker's intention to bypass audience consciousness 
to the greatest degree possible. The most effective bypassing of audience con-
sciousness would be subliminal persuasion, but the rhetoric of pep rallies and 
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partisan political gatherings is more likely that which one thinks about when con-
sidering rhetoric that does not drive a wedge At no point during a pep rally, for 
example, does the speaker wish his audience to ask, "Is it the case that our team 
really will, or better yet should, win the game tomorrow?" Rather, such perform-
ances bridge both the speaker and audience with the shared idea of the worthiness 
of a position. This bridge is an act of identification which precludes the possibility 
of alternative perspectives being brought to consciousness. Rather than bringing 
to light new consciousness, rhetoric that bridges in this way may be thought of as 
manipulating a consciousness already existing in an audience. This rhetoric is not 
precipitated by calling to the attention of the participants anything the truth of 
which they are not already persuaded of. Although some might regard this rhetoric 
to be part of what has traditionally been known as epideictic (rhetoric that displays 
that which is praiseworthy and blameworthy within a culture), we do not have to 
regard the function of epideictic as degenerate. We could point out, for example, 
that epideictic rhetoric attempts to bridge a person to a virtuous other, to teach 
public excellence by identifying an audience with public models of virtue. As a 
bridge, epideictic connects an audience's consciousness of virtuosity with a model 
of public virtue (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999, p. 76). 
Johnstone and I also looked to the common rhetorical techniques in addition to 
the genres of rhetoric for operations of the rhetorical bridge. We recognized that 
amplification, a favored and frequently used rhetorical technique, takes as its sub-
ject the undisputed. It draws from a common pool of readily available and agreed 
upon beliefs, values, and understandings. As Aristotle describes, when a particular 
consciousness is in an audience already, all that remains to be done by the rhetor is 
to attribute to it greater beauty and importance, in other words to celebrate this 
consciousness. We note that while this celebration is not a wedge, because it calls 
attention to nothing the audience did not already believe, it is a bridge. It is an 
appeal to the identification of "like" consciousness (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999, 
p.76). 
If arguments were to be made against "rhetoric is a wedge" that stemmed 
from such considerations as these, namely of the failure of rhetoric and wedge to 
coincide, it would be easy to defend the position. For example, we could point out 
that "rhetoric is a wedge" refers to a particular moment in a larger rhetorical 
process, a tri-partite process that begins with the evocation of consciousness and 
ends in decision after having proceeded through deliberation. The earlier part of 
the process, namely the evocation of consciousness of a particular problem, can 
be governed by the metaphor "rhetorical wedge" and the latter part of the process, 
namely the arrival of a decision, can be governed by the metaphor "rhetorical 
bridge." This would be the case whether we are speaking of the more traditional 
Aristotelian referent of public address, or whether we are speaking of a perform-
ance of identification beyond this, such as the reflexive rhetoric of personal delib-
eration. As Johnstone and I have noted, if rhetoric only wedges, when an indi-
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vidual is tom asunder by the recognition of a particular problem, the sundering will 
collapse into schizophrenia. The end of reflexive rhetoric would be to bridge the 
sundered mind, allowing for a unity manifest in a personal decision. Considering 
the possibilities of a response such as this, we might rest on the position that while 
"rhetoric is a wedge" may not need to be abandoned, it needs to be supplemented 
with "rhetoric is a bridge" (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999, p. 77). 
But should we rest here? Is supplementation of a position the same as revision? 
If by revision we mean that which one must pursue when he recognizes an incon-
sistency between his propositions and their formulation, and ifby supplementation 
we mean something in addition to the position in question, then supplementation is 
not the same as revision. A supplement in this regard is an addition to, not a 
confrontation of Such a supplement does not puncture "rhetoric is a wedge"; it 
leaves the proposition about rhetoric's function to distinguish and the formulation 
ofthis proposition intact and merely adds some new proposition about rhetoric's 
function to identify and the formulation of this proposition, namely "rhetoric is a 
bridge." But positing a "supplement" is not only insufficient for creating a genuine 
contact of minds, it is irrelevant to the enterprise. No contact is made between the 
advocate of rhetoric's function to identify and the advocate of rhetoric's function 
to distinguish. The two remain distinct without ever having to take each other 
seriously. 
Ifwe privilege the genuine confrontation of a position with difference, a con-
frontation that will force either revision or abandonment so that the inquiry can be 
elaborated by a genuine contact of minds, we will reject using such tactics for 
attacking and defending "rhetoric is a wedge." These tactics are cheap because 
they approach the question ad rem. Argumentum ad rem points to a world beyond 
that which is presented by the position in question, and in doing so fails to con-
front the position on its own terms. To attack the viability of "rhetoric is a wedge" 
by pointing out to the holder of that position that he has not accounted for the fact 
that "rhetoric is a bridge" begs the question. The attempt to call a person's atten-
tion to what his own principles prevent him from attending to is a petitio principii, 
akin for example to confronting a blind man with a stop sign (Johnstone, 1987, p. 
132). Arguing ad rem fails because a person's attention cannot be called to some-
thing that he is incapable of attending to by virtue of his own commitments. Each 
person attends to the world as characterized by whatever feature or features they 
regard as fundamental. This is easy to see in the world of ideas. Just as Parmenides 
never seems to notice change in the world, B.F. Skinner never seems to notice 
behavior not resulting from conditioning (Johnstone, 1987, p. 131). Argumenta-
tion as an activity of various advocates attending to various features but inattentive 
to others creates an impasse or stand-off where differences can only be pointed 
out and explained. We would likely not call this argumentation, but rather exposi-
tion. Opposing positions cannot be pointed out simply to a person because her 
own position renders her incapable of recognizing this opposition as a problem, or 
possibly even as a phenomenon. 
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If ad rem arguments are unavailable to us, how then do we confront a position 
with difference? We can begin to pursue this question with what Johnstone con-
sidered a general desideratum in formulating an argument, namely to approach 
argument self-referentially, in other words to attempt to confront a position by 
showing that on its own principles it is inconsistent. The significance of asserting 
that a position ought to be argued self-referentially is to imply that its validity 
depends on no reference to a fact or situation external to it (Johnstone, 1978, p. 
II). Much of Johnstone's writing on argumentation set out to show not only that 
self-referential refutation exemplifies a valid use of argumentum ad hominem, but 
also that many other types of argumentation belong to the same category of ad 
hominem. 
The ad hominem, as Johnstone treats it, can be approached most succinctly by 
way of contrast to ad rem argument. Johnstone draws from Richard Whately's 
treatment of ad hominem to distinguish it from argumentum ad rem. Whately states, 
"The conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one 
in question, but relative and particular; viz., not that 'such and such is the fact,' 
but that 'this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of reasoning, 
or consistency with his own conduct, situation,' &c." (Whately, 1838, p. 196). 
Argumentum ad rem exhibits those properties which, according to Whately, 
argumentum ad hominem does not. Thus argumentum ad rem claims to establish 
an absolute and general conclusion of the form "such and such is the fact." Its 
cogency does not depend on its audience in the way that the cogency of ad hom-
inem must. 
Ad rem arguments do not establish their conclusions based upon the principles 
of those to whom they are addressed, but ad hominem arguments must be estab-
lished from the principles of those to whom they are addressed. Ad hominem 
arguments in this way. engage the reasoning and adapt to the assumptions of the 
interlocutor. The motive is to reveal a contradiction in the interlocutor's position, 
and force an interlocutor to confront the commitments and consequences of her 
position. Such a revelation can only be witnessed from the perspective of the self, 
hence the ad hominem argument is evocative of self-awareness and the need to 
reflect responsibly on one's own position. 
Such argument will presuppose that the interlocutors see the point of a posi-
tion. However, one cannot see the point of a position until she grasps the motiva-
tion underlying the position. A problem arises now with the recognition of the 
insufficiency of describing the motives from which a philosophical position is 
taken, since such motives will themselves seem arbitrary. Suppose we are told that 
the rhetorical wedge stems from a concern with distinction, and the rhetorical 
bridge from a concern with identification. One might be tempted to ask what the 
point is of such concerns. Answering this question requires becoming involved in 
the differences between the rhetorical wedge and bridge, instead of being content 
merely to describe these differences. Being involved in the differences, we shall 
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have to be polemical instead of expository. Being polemical as such means we do 
not side-step the issues of an argument, but meet them and each other head-on. 
Such polemical argumentation is evocative. It evokes consciousness by address-
ing another where he lives, not by hitting him over the head with facts (Johnstone, 
1978, p. 137). What I have been introducing in this essay thus far as the contrast 
between ineffective argument about "rhetoric is a wedge" and the possibility of 
relatively effective argument is brought into perspective now through the differ-
ence between the use of argumentum ad rem and the use of argumentum ad hom-
inem. Relatively effective argument against "rhetoric is a wedge" is going to be ad 
hominem. 
Before proceeding, we need to return to the beginning, to the inquiry about 
why one would want to attack "rhetoric is a wedge". The contrast between ad rem 
and ad hominem arguments forces us to question whether the activity I have been 
engaging in thus far with "rhetoric is a wedge" is more like a game or a clever 
pursuit of the last wishes of a dying man and less a genuinely motivated argument. 
Genuine motivation would have to come from the recognition that a thesis needs 
to be confronted because of its inconsistency, in other words the inconsistency 
between its propositions and its formulation. Such an inconsistency would threaten 
to destroy the very principles a position is trying to establish. The only genuine 
reason to attack "rhetoric is a wedge" is if the formulation of this position demon-
strates such an inconsistency. And indeed the slogan "rhetoric is a wedge" does 
demonstrate such an inconsistency. The slogan, while proposing "rhetoric is a 
wedge," is itself actually rhetoric functioning to bridge, functioning to create iden-
tification with and adherence to the formulation of the position. Hence, the very 
advocacy of "rhetoric is a wedge" threatens to destroy it. The stronger the advo-
cacy of "rhetoric is a wedge," the stronger the motive to drive the wedge of 
"rhetoric is a wedge." Such strengthening of the activity, however, overwhelms 
the situation, and leads the advocate into self-referential inconsistency. The activ-
ity of the advocate of "rhetoric is a wedge" becomes unilateral. This exhibition of 
unilaterality shows the advocacy of "rhetoric is a wedge" to be inconsistent with 
the commitments that one who holds the position must make, namely those com-
mitments to bilaterality presupposed by the rhetorical wedge. Therein lies a genu-
ine motivation for argument about "rhetoric is a wedge." 
We might find that going to the idea that rhetoric is an interface might offer 
some specifics on revision. An interface is both a wedge and a bridge. It is a 
genuine gulf between the communication of information through language to an 
understanding subject. The peculiarity of this gulfis that it can be crossed. But the 
specifics of revision lie beyond the scope of this present essay. 
Before closing, I want to qualify that I am not suggesting that Johnstone's 
philosophy of argument advocated, as a means of positing, the position "rhetoric 
is a wedge." Johnstone was quite careful not to do this. He tells us as much in the 
opening of one of his most explicit treatments of the rhetorical wedge (Johnstone, 
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1990, p. 333). He notes that prior to the time that George Yoos referred to "rheto-
ric as a wedge" as part of Johnstone's theory of argument, Johnstone himself had 
only incidentally and in passing used the phrase.2 He also notes that most indexers 
of the books in which he had used the phrase had missed it altogether. I wish to 
suggest only that advocacy is a possible consequence of the rhetorical wedge 
taking hold in certain circles, say for example, in scholarly circles that might find 
the idea worth advocating as a critical perspective on discourse, or in pedagogical 
circles where teachers of rhetoric and argument might advocate the idea to their 
students as an ethical framework for their practice. 
Second, I do not want to suggest that what I call an inconsistency, anyone 
holding the position that "rhetoric is a wedge" will necessarily admit to be an 
inconsistency. The question arises then whether such an argument can really over-
come the solipsistic impasse that seemed to preclude genuine argument about 
"rhetoric is a wedge." This question requires much more attention than this essay 
can provide, including full attention to the Consistency Problem and the way in 
which this problem brings to light the need to reject notions of objective validity 
and to adopt notions of validity as a regulative ideal (Johnstone, 1978, p. 135). 
For now, however, we can be assisted by Johnstone's general framing of the 
situation: Suppose an advocate of A produces a presupposition involved in B that 
is, in his opinion, inconsistent with the formulation of B. What reason is there to 
suppose any advocate of B must agree that there is an inconsistency? If he need 
not agree, the impasse remains. Of course, the attacker may be mistaken. Perhaps 
what the attacker takes to be an inconsistency between the formulation of Band 
the presuppositions of B is not really an inconsistency. The question Johnstone 
raises however is just whether such an attacker must always be mistaken. Is it 
possible for an inconsistency to develop within a position that has reason on its 
side? If it is possible, that will be sufficient to overcome the impasse (Johnstone, 
1978, p. 50). Inconsistency is not a matter offact but a matter of probability. I am 
only prepared to frame the matter this way: if such inconsistency were to be 
accepted as inconsistency, it would necessitate that "rhetoric is a wedge" be re-
vised or abandoned on account of this inconsistency. However, abandonment seems 
an un likely outcome because the ad hominem argument calling attention to such an 
inconsistency is itself a rhetorical wedge opening up the advocate of the position 
that "rhetoric is a wedge" to the need to attend to his own position. 
Notes 
IThis reference can be found in De Anima 419a 17. 
2yoos's paper, "Rhetoric of Appeal and Rhetoric of Response." was presented at a session of 
The International Society for the History of Rhetoric in Chicago in November, 1986. It was 
later published in Philosophy and Rhetoric 20 (1987): J07- J J 7. 
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